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Abstract: In this paper we explore how the composition of a market maker’s portfolio and 
allocation of attention across securities in the portfolio affect pricing. We analyze whether 
more attention devoted to similar securities enables a market maker to extract information 
relevant to a stock from order flow to related securities and consequently whether it leads to 
improved price discovery of the stock. We base on the recent literature on allocation of 
attention in share trading (Corwin and Coughenour, 2008; Boulatov et al., 2009) and define 
the prominence of a security as the proportion of its dollar volume in the total volume of the 
specialist portfolio it belongs to. Our empirical tests are focused on New York Stock 
Exchange specialists and the U.S. share in price discovery of 64 British and French 
companies cross-listed on the NYSE. We define related securities as stocks from the same 
country, the same region or other foreign stocks. We find strong evidence that an increase in 
the prominence of related stocks in the specialist portfolio leads to a higher U.S. share in price 
discovery of our sample stocks. We interpret our findings as evidence that concentrating 
market makers in similar stocks reduces information asymmetries and improves the 
information environment. To support our argument, we show that an increase in the 
prominence of other foreign stocks in the specialist portfolio significantly reduces the adverse 
selection component of the bid-ask spread.  3
1. Introduction 
In this paper we explore how the composition of a market maker’s portfolio and 
allocation of attention across securities in the portfolio affect pricing. We analyze whether 
more attention devoted to similar securities improves the information environment and helps 
to incorporate new information in prices of a stock. Towards this end we look at New York 
Stock Exchange specialists and price discovery of non-U.S. stocks in their portfolios, which is 
an ideal setting to perform our tests. First, market making in non-U.S. stocks is associated 
with inherent information asymmetries (Bacidore and Sofianos, 2002) and we expect any 
benefits from the enhanced information environment to be particularly evident for foreign 
stocks. And second, by focusing on NYSE specialists we can observe individuals handling 
well-defined small sets of securities across which they must divide their attention (Corwin 
and Coughenour, 2008). On the basis of the trading activity within a specialist portfolio we 
can determine the relative prominence of every constituent of the portfolio. Our empirical 
tests are focused on the question of whether the prominence of other stocks from the same 
country, the same region or other foreign stocks in a specialist portfolio affects price 
discovery of a non-U.S. stock occurring on the NYSE relative to the stock’s home market. 
Our study complements the literature on the link between allocation of attention in securities 
trading and market quality (Corwin and Coughenour, 2008; Boulatov et al., 2009), but is also 
related to the substantial body of literature on price discovery in cross-listings and on the role 
of dedicated market makers (e.g., Venkataraman and Waisburd, 2007). 
According to anecdotal evidence, specialist firms aim to cluster related firms with 
individual specialists to exploit information advantages and match firm characteristics with 
specialists’ talents (see, Anand et al., 2008). The premise is supported by theoretical models. 
Strobl (2001) models the trade-off between a higher information precision when trading 
stocks with correlated payoffs and lower competition between dealers when the stocks are  4
clustered. He shows that both specialists and investors can benefit when related stocks are 
concentrated within specialists. In a similar vein, Baruch et al. (2007) develop a model to 
show that, when trading a set of related stocks, market makers can infer information from the 
observed order flow of the related stocks, and the order flow of one firm can be relevant for 
pricing of other firms. They argue that the clustering of closely related stocks can have a 
direct impact on the reduction of market making costs. Empirical studies of stock allocations 
confirm the tendency to cluster related stocks. Looking at the specialist firm level, Corwin 
(2004) finds that new stocks are allocated to firms that trade similar stocks, for example 
stocks in the same industry or other foreign stocks. At the individual specialist level, Anand et 
al. (2008) uncover that stocks reassignments between specialists within a specialist firm tend 
to increase industrial concentration of specialist portfolios. 
In this paper we employ the U.S. share in price discovery of non-U.S. stocks cross-
listed on the NYSE as our measure of the quality of the information environment of NYSE 
specialists and the competitiveness of NYSE pricing of cross-listed stocks. Earlier studies of 
price discovery in international cross-listings based on both daily and intraday data find that, 
on average, the home market is dominant in the pricing process.
1 However, the studies 
uncover a substantial variation in the foreign market’s contribution to price discovery across 
companies. For example, Eun and Sabherwal (2003) find that the U.S. share in price 
discovery of Canadian firms ranges from 0.2 percent to 98.2 percent. This guarantees that the 
U.S. share in price discovery can be used as a meaningful measure in our tests. Building on 
the theoretical arguments on informational benefits of concentrated market making we aim to 
explore whether the share in price discovery increases when related stocks have a greater 
importance in a specialist portfolio. We measure the relatedness at three levels: the group of 
stocks from the same country, the group of stocks from the same region and the group of all  5
non-U.S. stocks. We expect that stocks within these three groups have some degree of 
similarity and hence payoff correlation. The similarities can come from shared 
macroeconomic fundamentals including currency movements, common institutional factors, 
regulations or cultural and geographical proximity. 
To measure the concentration and stocks’ prominence in a portfolio we base on the 
recent literature on allocation of attention in share trading (Corwin and Coughenour, 2008; 
Boulatov et al., 2009). The underlying concept comes from the psychology literature on 
limited attention and constraints in the ability to process information (e.g., Kahneman, 1973). 
In the context of NYSE specialists, Corwin and Coughenour (2008) and Boulatov et al. 
(2009) argue that specialists allocate their attention across securities in their portfolios taking 
into account portfolio profits and risks, and most attention goes to most active stocks. The 
studies provide strong evidence that the market quality for individual stocks is driven by the 
attention allocated to them. We use the concept of attention to measure the prominence of 
stocks from the same country, the same region or foreign stocks in general in a NYSE 
specialist’s portfolio. Following the theoretical arguments in Strobl (2001) and Baruch et al. 
(2007), we expect informational advantages to arise when a specialist allocates more attention 
to similar stocks and hence is able to extract information relevant to a stock from order flow 
to related securities. Consequently, we expect that the U.S. share in price discovery is 
increasing with the prominence of similar firms. Our argument is also in line with one of the 
policy recommendations in Bacidore and Sofianos (2002) who suggest that the information 
environment can be enhanced by higher concentration of foreign stocks in particular 
specialists. Moreover, we expect that the U.S. share in price discovery is increasing in the 
stock’s own prominence in the portfolio, consistent with the notion that prices of stocks that 
receive more attention are more informative. 
                                                                                                                                                          
1 See, e.g. Lieberman et al. (1999), Kim et al. (2000), and Wang et al. (2002) for evidence on daily data; and 
Hupperets and Menkveld (2002), Eun and Sabherwal (2003), Grammig et al. (2005a, 2005b), Pascual et al.  6
Our sample consists of 64 NYSE-listed British and French companies and the sample 
period spans January to June 2003. As of the end of 2002, the United Kingdom had the largest 
number of NYSE cross-listings and the largest NYSE trading value among European 
countries, and France followed as the second and the fourth most important one, respectively. 
The estimated U.S. share in price discovery in our sample ranges from 0.0 percent to 70.2 
percent based on the approach proposed by Hasbrouck (1995), and from 0.0 percent to 86.4 
percent based on the method proposed by Gonzalo and Granger (1995). We argue that the 
significant differences in NYSE pricing of our sample of cross-listed stocks are driven by 
differences in the information environment across NYSE specialists who make a market in 
our sample stocks. Based on the meaningful cross-sectional variation of our price discovery 
measure we run a set of cross-sectional tests to show how the U.S. share in price discovery 
differs with the prominence of other related stocks in the specialist portfolio. We find strong 
evidence that the U.S. share in price discovery increases when a specialist pays more attention 
to other related stocks and there is a larger informational advantage from allocating attention 
across a broader set of international securities rather than focusing on country-specific groups 
of firms. We interpret the finding as evidence that a specialist who pays more attention to 
other related stocks has an informational advantage as he can extract information from order 
flow to a set of firms with correlated pay-offs. We support our argument by showing that the 
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread is reduced with the increased prominence 
of other foreign stocks in the portfolio. Our main findings and conclusions are robust to the 
exclusion of stocks reassigned between specialists in our sample period, the alternative 
definition of prominence, and to the alternative price discovery estimation methods. 
We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, our findings complement and 
extend the literature on the link between allocation of attention in securities trading and 
                                                                                                                                                          
(2006), Kaul and Mehrotra (2007), and Menkveld et al. (2007) for intraday studies.  7
market quality (Corwin and Coughenour, 2008; Boulatov et al., 2009). We show that not only 
the stock that receives more attention trades more efficiently but it is also important how 
much of the attention is allocated to related stocks in the portfolio. Second, we add to the 
literature on the value of dedicated market makers (e.g., Venkataraman and Waisburd, 2007). 
We analyze a trading design with dedicated specialists who are responsible for maintaining 
markets for a set of stocks and we show the empirical evidence to confirm theoretical 
predictions of the benefits of concentrating specialists in similar securities (Strobl, 2001; 
Baruch et al., 2007), and also to complement earlier empirical evidence on concentration 
(Corwin, 2004; Anand et al., 2008). And third, we add to the literature on price discovery in 
cross-listings by providing evidence on the intra-day price discovery process of NYSE-listed 
U.K and French stocks which are a significant group of foreign issuers on the NYSE. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The role of NYSE specialists and 
differences in market making in U.S. and non-U.S. stocks are outlined in Section 2. Section 3 
describes data sources and the sample of U.K. and French stocks under investigation. In 
Section 4, we present the methodology of our analysis. First, we discuss two approaches used 
to calculate relative contribution to the price discovery process based on Hasbrouck (1995) 
and Gonzalo and Granger (1995). Then, we outline the methodology of our cross-sectional 
analysis and construction of our prominence measures and control variables. Section 5 
presents the main empirical results and discusses various robustness checks. Section 6 
summarizes and concludes the paper. 
  8
2. The Role of NYSE Specialist and Market Making in Non-U.S. Stocks 
Every security traded on the NYSE has a single designated specialist.
2 The specialists 
are responsible for maintaining a fair and orderly market in assigned securities. They facilitate 
price discovery and maintain liquidity by posting firm and continuous bid and ask quotes, 
committing own capital to supply short-term liquidity in the absence of public bids and offers, 
and reducing stock price volatility by trading against the market trend. At times of significant 
information releases or extreme order imbalances, the specialist may halt trading to allow 
investors to react to new information. In line with the previous literature on NYSE specialists, 
we identify a specialist by a unique panel location on the NYSE floor. At the beginning of 
2003, specialists were located in 359 panels. Individual specialists are employed by specialist 
firms, and in 2003 there were seven specialist firms. When a new security is listed on the 
NYSE, the Exchange’s Allocation Committee shortlists applications from specialist firms 
interested in handling the security and then the listing firm chooses a specialist firm from this 
pool (see, Corwin (2004) for details). Specialists firms assign securities across their own 
individual specialists. Stocks are hardly ever relocated between specialist firms but 
reassignments of securities between specialists within a firm are relatively common (Anand et 
al., 2008; Corwin and Coughenour, 2008). 
There are inherent differences between making a market in non-U.S. stocks traded on 
the NYSE and their U.S. domestic counterparts. They result from different institutional details 
and differences in the flow of information related to the security. The foreign firms’ securities 
may not be fully fungible across home and U.S. markets, they may be subject to different 
national regulations, accounting and reporting standards, and their trading may be influenced 
by time zone differences between home country and the U.S., all of which can lead to 
                                                 
2 The market model based on specialists described here was in place until October 2008, covering our sample 
period. Under the new rules, NYSE specialists became Designated Market Makers (DDM). DDMs have no 
‘advanced look’ at incoming orders and hence compete as market participants but have new rights in the way 
they trade.  9
differences in pricing in markets where the firm lists (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2004). Moreover, 
foreign stocks are usually actively traded in their home markets and U.S. traders may have 
limited access to information on trading there. Domowitz et al. (1998) show that the level of 
information linkages between markets has a direct impact on the market quality. If the 
markets are not fully integrated and access to information is indeed limited, greater adverse 
selection increases trading costs when informed arbitrage traders exploit price differences at 
the expense of less informed liquidity providers.  
Empirical evidence of the importance of information asymmetry and adverse selection 
in trading behavior and liquidity provision by NYSE specialist in non-U.S. stocks is provided 
by Bacidore and Sofianos (2002). Using proprietary data, they find that specialist closing 
inventories for non-U.S. stocks are closer to zero than for U.S. stocks, and specialist 
participation and stabilization rates for non-U.S. developed market stocks are higher than 
those of U.S. stocks, while for non-U.S. emerging market securities they are significantly 
smaller. Non-U.S. stocks are also found to have larger spreads, less quoted depth and greater 
volatility. The authors conclude that higher trading costs reflect additional compensation 
demanded by the NYSE specialists to compensate for higher adverse selection risks borne in 
trading foreign stocks. Higher adverse selection inherent in trading non-U.S. stocks is 
confirmed by Bacidore et al. (2005) in a study of the sources of liquidity for non-U.S. NYSE-
listed stocks. They find that foreign stocks have less displayed liquidity and a similar level of 
non-displayed liquidity than comparable U.S. stocks. In a related study, Moulton and Wei 
(2009) document narrower spreads and more competitive liquidity provision for NYSE-listed 
European stocks when their home markets are open. The authors interpret these findings as 
evidence of the impact of the availability of substitutes and the improved information 
environment of specialist trading during the trading overlap.  10
Bacidore and Sofianos (2002) provide a few policy recommendations which they 
believe could lead to a reduction in information asymmetries associated with market making 
in foreign stocks and hence could reduce trading costs and increase NYSE competitiveness. 
One of the suggestions is a stock allocation policy that encourages concentration of non-U.S. 
stocks in particular specialists.
3 Bacidore and Sofianos (2002) argue that ‘a specialist 
‘‘specializing’’ in Mexican stocks, for example, will have strong incentives to develop ties 
with the home market including, possibly, an association with local broker-dealers’ (p. 157). 
Corwin (2004) confirms that newly listed non-U.S. stocks indeed tend to be allocated to 
specialist firms that already trade other foreign stocks. The benefits of the concentration go 
beyond the institutional links with international stock markets though. They are also related to 
the theoretical arguments on informational advantages of clustering similar stocks with 
correlated payoffs in market makers’ books (Strobl, 2001; Baruch et al., 2007). As shown by 
Baruch et al. (2007), when market makers trade ‘closely related’ stocks, they can infer 
information not only from an asset’s own order flow, but also from order flows of the other 
related assets. The authors build a theoretical model and provide empirical evidence which 
shows that the volume in the U.S. is higher for cross-listed stocks that are correlated with 
other stocks traded in the U.S. market, and that is explained by the lower costs of trading in 
these cross-listed stocks. 
 
3. Data and Sample 
The data were taken from various sources. NYSE trades and quotes were downloaded 
from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. The London Stock Exchange and the Euronext 
Paris provided tick data at one minute interval on domestic trading of British and French 
stocks, respectively. Intra-day exchange rates were obtained from Olsen. Data on the ratio of 
                                                 
3 Other policy recommendations include extension of NYSE trading hours, developing and strengthening 
linkages between the NYSE and foreign stock markets and efforts to improve insider trading regulations across  11
ADR and ordinary shares come from The Bank of New York web page (www.adrbny.com), 
and allocation of stocks across specialists is from the NYSE. The sample period spans six 
months from January 2003 through June 2003 and covers 122 trading days in both U.K. and 
French subsamples, after exclusion of public holidays in either home or U.S. market. All three 
stock markets (U.S., U.K. and France) followed similar patterns during this period. There was 
a downward drift with a local minimum of market indices about mid-March, followed by 
upward trend towards the end of the sample period. There seems to be no single event or day 
that may be particularly noteworthy over those six months.  
The sample includes British and French companies listed on the domestic exchange 
and cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange throughout the whole six-month sample 
period. We exclude two companies that changed ADR ratios (British Energy and P&O 
Princess Cruises) since this action could have a significant impact on liquidity (see, 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1996). Any shocks to liquidity and microstructure environment 
for our sample stocks could lead to a break in comparability of the relevant characteristics of 
the home and U.S. markets throughout the period. We also exclude ADRs representing 
preferred stocks, as their pricing mechanism may be substantially different from common 
ADRs and ordinary shares. We depart from many prior studies by not making any exclusions 
on the basis of trading intensity and liquidity. We investigate the price discovery process and 
its determinants in the breadth of the sample, not confining it to the most liquid, and hence 
conceivably largest companies.
4 Altogether, our sample includes 64 companies, 43 from the 
U.K. and 21 from France. Table 1 presents basic characteristics of the sample stocks. 
                                                                                                                                                          
the globe. 
4 Additionally, for France Telecom, we exclude the period between March 25, 2003 and April 14, 2003 which 
was the difference between the date of distribution of warrants to holders of ordinary shares and the date of 
distribution of cash proceeds from the sale of warrants to holders of ADRs. In that period, the price difference 
between ADRs and ordinary shares depended on the price of warrants. Similarly, for Lafarge we exclude the 
period after June 19, 2003 that was the date of distribution of rights in the local markets only. Proceeds from the 
sale of these local rights were distributed to the ADR holders at a later date outside our sample period.  12
The market capitalization of individual firms varies from USD 196 million for 
France’s Compagnie Generale de Geophysique to USD 146,975 million for BP. While there 
is no clear difference in the average size of U.K. and French sample companies and their 
home liquidity, U.K. stocks tend to have higher liquidity in the U.S. market, as measured by 
trading volume and spreads, than their French counterparts. Still, in both U.K. and French 
subsamples liquidity in the home market is overwhelmingly larger than in the U.S. in terms of 
the dollar trading volume and the number of trades. The sample mean (median) dollar trading 
volume in the U.S. market as a percent of the total dollar trading volume in both the home and 
the U.S. market during the overlapping trading hours is 4.4% (2.0%). For only two stocks, BP 
and France’s STMicroelectronics, the NYSE captures more than 20% of total trading 
volume.
5 The lower liquidity in the U.S. is also reflected in larger effective spreads which are, 
on average, over twice larger in the U.S. than in the home market. However, it is worth noting 
the frequent quote revisions in the U.S. market. There are fewer revisions in the U.S. than in 
the home market but the gap is considerably smaller than the gap in the trading activity. 
The London Stock Exchange and the Euronext Paris are automated, electronic limit 
order markets, and the New York Stock Exchange operates as a hybrid system, with both a 
limit book and specialists acting as market makers (see, for example, Parlour and Seppi 
(2003) and Hendershott and Moulton (2009) for details). There is a two-hour overlap in 
trading in the three exchanges. It starts at 14:30 GMT (9:30 EST) when the U.S. market opens 
and lasts until 16:30 GMT (11:30 EST) when both London and Paris exchanges close. The 
exact overlap between Paris and London excludes the possibility of the results being 
influenced by different trading designs. Figure 1 depicts trading times in the markets covered 
by the study. Specifically, since we focus on continuous trading only, our price series from 
                                                 
5 Our estimates are similar to Moulton and Wei’s (2009) who find in their sample of 40 U.K. stocks cross-listed 
on the NYSE in the whole 2003 that, on average, 4.4% of global trading occurred on the NYSE, with a range of 
less than 1% to 27%. The findings are consistent with findings by Halling et al. (2008), who document the  13
the Euronext Paris end at 16:25 GMT, when continuous trading finishes followed by the 
closing auction. The closing auction in London starts after 16:30 GMT. Because daylight 
saving time started in Europe one week earlier than in the U.S., there was a one-hour overlap 
(15:30-16:30 GMT) from March 30, 2003 to April 6, 2003. 
Following the approach commonly used in previous intra-day price discovery studies, 
we form our price series on the basis of equally-spaced midpoints of the best bid and ask 
quotes. Using transaction prices instead may suffer from the problem of autocorrelation and, 
moreover, quotes can be updated even if there is no trading. Supporting evidence for that is 
reported in Table 1, where differences in the frequency of quoting between the home and the 
U.S. market are visibly smaller than discrepancies in the trading volume and the number of 
transactions. We set our interval to one minute
6, and each point in our price series represents 
the average of the last best bid and ask prices within the 1-minute interval. If no change of the 
best quotes is reported within the interval, the observation represents the last available quotes. 
The first 1-minute interval each day containing quotes in both markets is the initial 
observation for that day in our series.
7 The choice of the sampling interval is done arbitrarily 
with a tradeoff in mind between too many stale quotes if the interval is too narrow and 
dissolution of one-way causality into contemporaneous correlations when too much activity is 
observed within an interval at lower frequencies. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Measures of Information Shares 
                                                                                                                                                          
widespread presence of flow-back towards the home market and a decline in foreign trading to extremely low 
levels. 
6 As a robustness check we perform the analysis on the 2, 3 and 10-minute intervals. See Section 5 for the 
discussion of the results. 
7 The median NYSE opening delay across 7785 firm-day observations in our sample is 4 minutes. In 25 cases it 
is longer than 15 minutes, and in 3 cases it is longer than 30 minutes.  14
  In calculating the information share of the U.S. and home markets in the price 
discovery process, we use both the Hasbrouck (1995) information share technique and the 
Gonzalo and Granger (1995) common component method. These models are the two most 
prevalent common factor models. They are directly related and the results of both models are 
primarily derived from the vector error correction model (VECM). They provide similar 
results if the VECM residuals are uncorrelated. In the case where there is contemporaneous 
correlation we use Cholesky factorization, which is, however, variable order dependent. 
Following Hasbrouck’s (1995) suggestion we use different orders and average the upper and 
lower information share bounds. In our paper, we use both of the above models as 
complementary methods.
8 We present below both estimation approaches based on Baillie et 
al. (2002). 
  We expect the price of an instrument cross-listed in a foreign market, adjusted for the 
exchange rate, not to deviate from the price in the home market. The law of one price, which 
prevents any arbitrage opportunities in international cross-listings, implies a cointegrating 
relationship between the log home price,  t p1 , and log U.S. price,  t p2 , converted to the same 
currency with a cointegrating vector  () ( ) ' 1 , 1 ' , 2 1 − = = β β β . In our analysis, we denominate 
all price series in U.S. dollars and convert local U.K. and French prices using intra-day 
exchange rates.
9 Both models start from the estimation of the following VECM: 
(1)     t
k
j




1 ' αβ ,                        
where  () ' , 2 1 α α α =  is the error correction vector,  )' , ( 2 1 t t t p p P =  is a vector of log prices and 
t e  is a zero-mean vector of serially uncorrelated innovations with covariance matrix Ω, 
                                                 
8  Previous studies have used one of the two methods, e.g. Eun and Sabherwal (2003) and Kaul and Mehrotra 
(2007) use the Gonzalo-Granger method, while Grammig et al. (2005a, 2005b) use the Hasbrouck method. 
9 The main results remain unchanged when we convert the price series to local currencies, i.e. to pounds for U.K. 
stocks and to euros for French stocks.  15
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The VECM has two components: the first one,  1 ' − t P αβ , represents the long-run or 
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the short-term dynamics caused by market imperfections. 
Hasbrouck (1995) transforms equation (1) into a vector moving average (VMA) in an 
integrated form 
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s
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1
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where  ) (L ψ  and  ) ( * L ψ  are matrix polynomials in the lag operator, L.  Denoting 
) , ( 2 1 ψ ψ ψ =  as the common row vector in  ) 1 ( ψ , equation (3) becomes 
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=
,                                
where  )' , ( 1 1 = ι  is a column vector of ones. 
The increment  t e ψ  in equation (4) is considered by Hasbrouck (1995) as the component 
of the price change that is permanently impounded into the price and could be due to new 
information. He defines this component as the common efficient price – common factor.  If 
price innovations are significantly correlated across prices, Hasbrouck (1995) uses Cholesky 
factorization  ' MM = Ω  to eliminate the contemporaneous correlation, where: 
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If we further denote  )' , ( 2 1 γ γ α ⊥= , which is also the Γ in Gonzalo and Granger’s 
(1995) model, then the information shares of the two prices are: 
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In order to get the information share of each market, the order of the prices is changed 
and the calculation process is repeated. The average of the two results is suggested by 
Hasbrouck to be the final information share. 
Gonzalo and Granger (1995) define the common factor to be a combination of the 
variables  t P , such that  t t P h Γ = , where Γ is the common factor coefficient vector. The 
information shares of the two markets according to this model are as follows:  
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= S . 
Thus, the Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) approach is concerned with only the error 
correction process, which involves only permanent as opposed to transitory shocks that result 
in a disequilibrium. It ignores the correlation among the two prices and measures each price’s 
contribution to the common factor on the basis of its error term. The price which adjusts the 
least to the other price movements has the leading role in the price discovery process. In 
contrast, Hasbrouck (1995) defines price discovery in terms of the variance of the innovations 
to the common factor assuming that price volatility reflects the flow of information. 
Information share in this model is each price’s relative contribution to the variance.
10 
We conduct the usual procedures of unit root and cointegration tests before estimating 
the information share of each market. Because overnight price discovery may follow different 
dynamics, overnight returns and lags that reach the previous day are excluded from the 
                                                 
10 According to Baillie et al. (2002) the two models complement each other and provide different views of the 
price discovery process between markets. On the other hand, de Jong (2002) concludes that Hasbrouck’s 
measure is a more proper measure of the amount of information generated by each market. Harris et al. (2002) 
have different view and employ Granger and Gonzalo (1995) to estimate and test common factor components 
attributable to each market.  17
estimation. Consequently, for each stock we exclude first k observations of the dependent 
variables each day. The lag length k  is determined by the Schwarz Information Criterion 
(SIC). 
  
4.2. Cross-Sectional Analysis of the U.S. Contribution to Price Discovery 
The size of our sample, 64 stocks in total, enables us to run cross-sectional regressions 
to examine factors which affect the size of the U.S. market contribution to price discovery. 
Our dependent variable is the logistic transformation of the U.S. market contribution to price 
discovery.
11 The logistic transformation ensures that the predicted values lie between zero and 
one, which by definition are the bounds of the contribution.  
We start with a set of the following regressions to analyze the association between the 
U.S. share in price discovery and stocks’ prominence in specialist portfolios: 
(10)  U.S. share in price discoveryi = β0 + β1 Own prominencei + εi ; 
(11)  U.S. share in price discoveryi = β0 + β1 Prominence of related stocksi + εi ; 
(12)  U.S. share in price discoveryi = β0 + β1 Own prominencei + 
  +  β2 Prominence of related stocks less owni + εi . 
Related stocks refer to stocks from the same country, European stocks or non-U.S. stocks 
interchangeably. To calculate the prominence variables we base on approaches in Corwin and 
Coughenour (2008) and Boulatov et al. (2009). First, we collect all daily NYSE specialist 
directory files for our sample period. The files list the specialist firm assigned to each 
security, as well as the trading location of the security on the NYSE floor as described by 
different posts and panels. There are 18 posts and various alphabetically labeled panels on 
each post, and the individual specialist responsible for each stock is identified by a unique 
post and panel. On the basis of the files we identify the post and panel location of our 64 
                                                 
11  If  S  is the information share, then our dependent variable is  () () S S − 1 ln .  18
sample stocks and for every day in our sample period we identify all other stocks traded 
together with the sample stocks in the same location. We call all stocks traded in the same 
location a specialist portfolio. Following Corwin and Coughenour (2008), in our analysis we 
include only common stocks and ADRs (CRSP share codes equal to 10, 11, 12, 30 or 31). 
Using TAQ trading data, for every security for every day in our sample we calculate 
the dollar volume in the trading overlap between New York and London and New York and 
Paris. We define a stock’s prominence as the proportion of its dollar volume in the total 
volume of the specialist portfolio it belongs to.
12 In regressions (10) and (11) we look at the 
stock’s own prominence, the prominence of all stocks from the same country (i.e., all U.K. or 
all French stocks, respectively) in the portfolio, the prominence of all European stocks in the 
portfolio and the prominence of all non-U.S. stocks in the portfolio. To disentangle the effect 
of a stock’s own prominence and the effect of the prominence of other related stocks in the 
specialist portfolio, in regression (12) we also look at the prominence of related stocks that 
excludes the stock’s own prominence. All prominence variables are calculated for each 
sample firm for each day and then averaged over the sample period. The daily calculation 
allows for daily changes in the composition of a specialist portfolio due to stock 
reassignments between specialists, new stock listings or delistings. 
We further proceed with a set of regressions that control for factors found to affect the 
foreign market’s share in price discovery of cross-listed stocks: 
(13)  U.S. share in price discoveryi = β0 + β1 Own prominencei + 
  +  β2 Prominence of related stocks less owni + 
  +  β3 U.S. / Total dollar volumei + β4 U.S. / Home effective spreadi + 
  +  β5 Ln (Market capitalizationi) + β6 U.K. dummyi + εi . 
                                                 
12 As a robustness test we recalculate the prominence on the basis of the number of trades rather than the dollar 
volume. The results are unchanged.  19
Eun and Sabherwal (2003) and Grammig et al. (2005b) show that the share in the price 
discovery process is directly related to the share in total trading volume and inversely related 
to the ratio of bid-ask spreads.
13 A higher share in total trading is likely to increase efficiency 
of the market and may indicate informativeness of the underlying demand (Stickel and 
Verrecchia, 1994). As suggested by Foerster and Karolyi (1998), it may also reflect higher 
competition for order flow by the foreign market, which might make the local market more 
responsive to the foreign market prices. For each stock, we calculate the dollar trading volume 
in the U.S. as a percentage of the total home and U.S. dollar volume within the trading 
overlap for each day in the sample period, and then the daily observations are averaged over 
the sample period. The bid-ask spread represents a major proportion of the trading costs, and 
we expect the U.S. market contribution to the price discovery process to increase when its 
spreads relative to domestic spreads decline. The lower the spread on the U.S. exchange, the 
greater the competition from the U.S. market makers and the greater the response of the local 
markets. On the NYSE trades often occur inside the bid-ask quotes reflecting price 
improvements coming from specialists or floor brokers (see, Chordia et al., 2001), therefore 
we look at effective spreads to capture competitiveness between markets.
14 Effective spread is 
calculated as twice the absolute value of the difference between the trade price and the 
midpoint of the prevailing bid and ask quotes at the time of the trade, divided by the quote 
midpoint. It is averaged across all trades for a given firm within the trading overlap each day, 
and then the daily observations are averaged over the sample period. 
We also control for the firm size measured as the logarithm of the average daily 
market capitalization (in millions of U.S. dollars) over the sample period.
15 Larger firms have 
high transparency and tend to be of greater interest to foreign investors as found by studies of 
                                                 
13 Harris et al. (2003) make also a connection between liquidity, information and home bias in international 
investment. Domestic investors may be better informed and better able to monitor local firms than foreign firms. 
14 The exchanges in London and Paris are electronic order markets and transactions occur at the quoted bid or 
ask prices. In this respect effective spread is equal to the quoted spread.  20
cross-border stock holdings (see e.g., Kang and Stulz, 1997). We further control for the 
company’s country of origin by including a dummy variable equal to one for British 
companies and to zero for French ones. This is a proxy for familiarity and for sharing the 
same language and cultural background, which are documented to influence stock holding 
and trading decisions (see, e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001, and Chan et al., 2005). We can 
expect a relatively higher U.S. share in price discovery for U.K. stocks than for French stocks. 
Definitions of all explanatory variables used in the regressions are summarized in the 
Appendix. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Vector Error Correction Results and the U.S. Share in Price Discovery 
We perform ADF unit root tests on the levels of two log price series for each sample 
firm using three different test specifications, i.e. without constant, with a constant and with a 
constant and time trend. The test in the first specification does not reject the null hypothesis of 
a unit root at the 5% significance level for any of the firms. We obtain rejections at the 5% 
level for at least one of the two price series for 6 stocks in the test with a constant, and for 4 
stocks in the test with a constant and trend. For differenced series we can reject the null of a 
unit root at the 1% significance level for all stocks. In the next step we test for cointegration 
between prices in the home and U.S. market using the Johansen’s (1991) trace statistic. For all 
sample stocks, we can reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. 
The lag structure of the VECM is determined by the SIC criterion. We started with 15 
lags, and then keeping the number of observations constant, we re-estimated the model at 
each shorter lag. The lag length that minimizes the criterion varies from one for Compagnie 
Generale de Geophysique to 13 for The BOC Group, with the sample mean and median of 7 
                                                                                                                                                         
15  Market capitalization data are taken from Datastream.  21
lags. Cross-sectional descriptive statistics of the estimated cointegrating vectors are presented 
in Panel A of Table 2. We normalize our estimates on the home market by setting  1 β  equal to 
one. As expected, prices in the home and U.S. market move closely together, and the average 
estimates of the elements of the cointegrating vector are close to the β  vector of the form 
() ' 1 , 1 − = β  as indicated by the theory of the law of one price. We find median  2 β  is equal to 
–1.0029. Divergence from the theoretical value of minus one in the case of individual stocks 
is conceivably caused by transaction costs bounds implying that small divergences cannot be 
arbitraged away. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents cross-sectional descriptive statistics of the estimates of the 
error correction vectors α  from the Vector Error Correction Models given by equation (1). 
The error correction vectors provide information on the adjustment of each price series to the 
deviation from the equilibrium in the previous period,  1 ' − t P β . Either or both home share and 
ADR prices must respond to the deviation to prevent riskless arbitrage opportunities. For 
instance, if the price in the U.S. market is lower than the price in the home market (adjusted 
for the exchange rate), the U.S. price will increase and the home market price will decrease in 
the following period to restore the equilibrium.
16 Thus, the expected signs of 
H α  and 
US α  
will be negative and positive, respectively, and their absolute values show the magnitude of 
the response. We find that the median adjustment coefficient for the home market prices,  1 α , 
is -0.0076 compared to the median correction in the U.S. market,  2 α , of 0.0363. Looking at 
the significance of individual estimates (not reported in the table),  1 α  has a negative sign and 
is significant at the 5% level for 30 out of 64 stocks. In contrast, adjustment in the U.S. 
market,  2 α , is positive and significant at the 5% level for 63 out of 64 stocks. The results 
provide first evidence that new information tends to be incorporated into stock prices in the  22
home market, while the U.S. market follows and is responsive to what is happening on the 
home exchange. 
  We subsequently calculate the U.S. share in the price discovery process using both the 
Hasbrouck (1995) information share approach as given by equation (7) and the Gonzalo and 
Granger (1995) common component method as given by (9).
17 Descriptive cross-sectional 
statistics of the shares in the whole sample, as well as in the U.K. and French subsamples are 
presented in Panels C and D of Table 3. Looking first at Panel C which reports the results of 
the Gonzalo-Granger approach, we find that the mean contribution of the U.S. market in our 
whole sample is 20.3% with the median of 14.3%. While there is no difference in the mean 
contribution between U.K and French stocks, U.K. stocks have a higher median U.S. 
contribution. The results for the Hasbrouck method are presented in Panel D. The mean 
(median) U.S. information share is 15.5% (9.0%) and there is a very small difference between 
the UK and the French stocks. As noted earlier the Cholesky factorization of the innovation 
variance-covariance matrix produces results which are variable order dependent. We adopt 
Hasbrouck’s (1995) suggestion and report the average of both extreme bounds. In our case the 
mean (median) lower bound for the U.S. share in price discovery is 6.4% (2.8%) when the 
home price comes first in the ordering and the mean (median) upper bound is 24.6% (16.2%) 
when the U.S. price comes first.
18 It is worth noting that the correlation between the price 
discovery measures calculated according to the Gonzalo-Granger method and the Hasbrouck 
method is 0.96. 
                                                                                                                                                         
16 It is also possible that the home price increases and the U.S. price increases more, or the home price decreases 
but the U.S. price decreases less. 
17 For five stocks both  1 α  and  2 α  are positive. In those cases the home market seems not to be affected by the 
divergence from equilibrium. In the following minute, the home market moves further away and the U.S. market 
makes up for the divergence adjusting more in absolute values. The Gonzalo-Granger method yields a negative 
U.S. share in price discovery then. In those cases we arbitrarily assign a 0.01% U.S. share in the price discovery 
to make it tractable in further steps involving logistic transformation of the variable.  
18 The distance between the lower and upper bound is driven by the correlation of VECM residuals. The average 
correlation coefficient in our estimations is 0.27.  23
Thus, similarly to earlier studies, we find a dominant role of the home market in price 
discovery. Our average estimates are below the U.S. share in the pricing process of cross-
listed Canadian companies found by Eun and Sabherwal (2003). Their mean and median are 
38.1% and 36.2%, respectively. The difference could be due to the higher economic 
integration between Canada and U.S. and to the larger proportion of trading on U.S. 
exchanges in total trading of cross-listed Canadian stocks. However, Kaul and Mehrotra 
(2007), who also examined Canadian stocks, report a difference between U.S. price discovery 
share for cross-listed stocks in NYSE and NASDAQ. They find that the mean (median) is 
13% (6%) for NYSE stocks and 47% (41%) for NASDAQ stocks. Looking at other European 
cross-listed stocks, our results show a larger role of the U.S. market than the results of 
Grammig et al. (2005a) for German blue chips, and are of a similar magnitude to Hupperets 
and Menkveld (2002) findings for Dutch companies. 
  From our perspective, the most important finding is the meaningful cross-sectional 
variability of the price discovery measure, in line with previous studies on different samples. 
We find that the estimated U.S. share in the pricing process varies from virtually zero to as 
high as 70.2% according to the Hasbrouck method and even 86.4% according to the Gonzalo-
Granger method. Stocks with the highest U.S. share in price discovery following the Gonzalo-
Granger (Hasbrouck) approach are Bunzl 86.4% (67.0%), Total 81.4% (70.2%), BP 57.9% 
(48.2%), HSBC Holdings 55.9% (41.5%) and AstraZeneca 55.8% (49.1%). On the other 
hand, the U.S. market contributes less than 2% to price discovery of Technip, Compagnie 
Generale de Geophysique, Scor, Veolia Environment, Publicis Groupe, Corus Group, Enodis 
and Premier Farnell. We interpret the dispersion of the U.S. share in price discovery in our 
sample as evidence of differences in the information environment of NYSE specialists who 
are market makers our sample stocks. In the subsequent sections we explore how the U.S.  24
share in price discovery varies with the prominence of related stocks in the specialist portfolio 
which, we argue, has an impact on the informational advantage of specialists. 
As a robustness check we re-estimate the shares in price discovery lowering the 
frequency to 2, 3 and 10 minutes. With lower frequencies we may reduce the number of stale 
quotes, but an important caveat is in order. With lower sampling frequencies cross-correlation 
between price changes in the home and U.S. market increases leading to larger estimation 
errors in the markets’ share in price discovery. Contemporaneous price movements in larger 
windows blur the picture and make it difficult to assign the role in price discovery to 
individual markets. In the Hasbrouck approach, the cross-correlation results in a wider gap 
between the lower and upper bound of the information share, ultimately pushing the midpoint 
between the two towards the 50% mark. Indeed, the mean (median) Hasbrouck’s U.S. share in 
price discovery increases monotonically from 15.5% (9.0%) for a 1-minute interval to 36.4% 
(38.4%) for a 10-minute interval. The estimates according to the Gonzalo-Granger method are 
more stable, and their sample mean (median) changes from 20.3% (14.3%) for a 1-minute 
interval to 29.0% (25.5%) for a 10-minute interval. 
 
5.2. Prominence of Stocks in Specialist Portfolios 
This section analyzes the prominence measures of the sample stocks – our main 
explanatory variables of interest. As defined in detail in Section 4.2, a stock’s prominence is 
proxied by the proportion of its dollar volume in the total volume of the specialist portfolio it 
belongs to. We look at the prominence of our sample stocks and at the prominence of a set 
other similar stocks assigned to the same NYSE specialist. We define similar stocks at three 
levels: as stocks from the same country, the same region (in our case Europe) or other foreign 
stocks. The descriptive statistics of the measures for all sample stocks and for the U.K. and 
French subsamples are presented in Table 3.  25
The average prominence of our sample stocks in their respective post and panel 
locations is 11.3%. Each stock is, on average, located with sibling stocks from the same 
country that generate 10.2% prominence, bringing the total prominence of all stocks from the 
same country to 21.5%. The average stock is also assigned to a specialist who allocates 40.7% 
of his attention to other European stocks and as high as 61.7% of his attention to other non-
U.S. stocks. Our findings extend the evidence in Corwin (2004) who finds that foreign firms 
tend to be clustered in NYSE specialist firms. We further find that specialist firms tend to 
concentrate foreign stocks in individual specialists, and more than a quarter of our sample 
firms are assigned to panels that trade non-U.S. stocks only. It is worth noting though that 
specialist firms appear to concentrate individual specialists in international stocks from 
multiple countries as opposed to concentrating them in securities from one country or one 
region. If the latter was the case, we would find no or little difference between the prominence 
of country’s, European and non-U.S. stocks as a specialist with, for example, U.K. stocks 
would trade few other European or non-U.S. stocks. Furthermore, we find substantial cross-
sectional variation of all prominence variables, which squares with the cross-sectional 
variation in the price discovery measure reported earlier. The meaningful differences in the 
variables across our sample stocks lend further support to the design of our empirical tests. 
Looking at the statistics across the U.K. and French subsamples, we find that U.K. 
stocks tend to be assigned to specialist portfolios with a larger average prominence of other 
stocks from the same country (11.7% versus 7.2% for French firms) but with a lower 
prominence of other European or other non-U.S. stocks (38.1% versus 45.8%, and 58.8% 
versus 67.7%, respectively). Despite the higher NYSE dollar trading volume for U.K than for 
French stocks as reported in Table 1, there is no gap between the average measure of own 
prominence between U.K. and French firms. It is consistent with Boulatov et al. (2009) who 
show that there is no evidence that specialist firms follow a simple rule whereby stocks with  26
the highest trading activity are assigned to be the most prominent stocks in their respective 
locations. Similarly to Boulatov et al. (2009) we interpret our finding as evidence that the 
prominence is not driven solely by trading activity but is determined by the way specialist 
firms assign stocks to individual specialists. It further validates the empirical design of our 
tests and strengthens our argument on the importance of the specialist portfolio composition 
and allocation of attention across stocks in the portfolio that go beyond the absolute trading 
activity of the sample stocks. 
Table 4 presents correlation coefficients between the prominence variables and other 
explanatory variables we use in the subsequent cross-sectional regressions. The measure of 
own prominence is highly correlated with the U.S. share in total trading volume (correlation 
coefficient of 0.82) which is not surprising considering that both variables are derived from 
the stock’s trading activity. Own prominence is also strongly negatively correlated with 
another measure of relative liquidity, the ratio of effective spreads (coefficient of -0.47), and 
positively correlated with the size of the firm proxied by the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization (coefficient of 0.67). By construction, Own prominence is positively correlated 
with the prominence of the country’s, European and non-U.S. stocks, with the strength of the 
correlation diminishing towards the higher level of aggregation. The three control variables, 
U.S. / Total dollar volume, U.S. / Home effective spread and Ln (Market capitalization), are 
correlated between one another with the absolute values of the correlation coefficients of just 
under 0.50. However, there is no significant correlation between them and the prominence of 
the group of related stocks that exclude the stock’s own prominence. To minimize the 
potential impact of multicollinearity on our results, the correlations between the explanatory 
variables are taken into account in the choice of regression specifications in the following 
section. 
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5.3. Multivariate Cross-Sectional Analysis 
In this section we present results of a set of cross-sectional regressions to show how 
the U.S. share in price discovery differs with the prominence of related stocks in the specialist 
portfolio. The dependent variable in the regressions is the logistic transformation of the U.S. 
share in price discovery. The results are presented separately for the shares in price discovery 
calculated following the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and Hasbrouck (1995) methods. 
We start with regressions that analyze the link between price discovery and 
prominence without controlling for other factors, as shown in Table 5 (the Gonzalo-Granger 
method) and Table 6 (the Hasbrouck method). The specifications minimize the potential 
problem of multicollinearity, considering the high correlations between Own prominence and 
the control variables presented in Table 4. Overall, we find strong evidence that the U.S. share 
in price discovery increases with the stock’s own prominence in the NYSE specialist 
portfolio, with highly significant positive coefficients across all regression specifications and 
both price discovery estimation methods. The result confirms the findings in Corwin and 
Coughenour (2008) and Boulatov et al. (2009) who document improved market quality for 
stocks that receive more attention. Specifications (ii), (iv) and (vi) presented in the tables look 
at the prominence of groups of related stocks: stocks from the same country, European stocks 
and non-U.S. stocks, respectively. By construction those variables capture the stock’s own 
prominence but also measure the prominence of other related stocks traded by the same 
specialist. We find that the estimated coefficients are also consistently positive and highly 
significant. 
However, our main interest focuses on the incremental impact of the prominence of 
other related firms over the stock’s own prominence and the results for such tests are 
presented in columns (iii), (v) and (vii) of the tables. We find that a greater prominence of 
other similar stocks assigned to the same specialist portfolio increases the U.S. share in price  28
discovery of our sample stocks. The coefficients are positive and statistically significant in all 
but one specification (Prominence of country’s stocks less own with the share in price 
discovery calculated using the Hasbrouck method presented in column (iii) of Table 6), and 
the addition of the variable reflecting the prominence of other related stocks improves the 
explanatory power of regressions measured by adjusted R-square. To illustrate the economic 
significance of the prominence of similar stocks
19, with Own prominence set to its sample 
median, increasing the prominence of other stocks from the same country from the 25
th to the 
75
th percentile of its distribution increases the U.S. share in price discovery of the stock by 2.6 
percentage points. The same increase in the prominence of other European stocks increases 
the U.S. share in price discovery by 3.7 percentage points, while an increase in the 
prominence of other non-U.S. stocks moves the U.S. market’s contribution up by as much as 
8.3 percentage points. To put this in a perspective, the median U.S. share in price discovery 
calculated according to the Gonzalo-Granger method is 14.3%. We interpret the finding as 
evidence that a specialist who pays more attention to other similar stocks has an informational 
advantage. He can extract information from order flow to a set of firms with correlated pay-
offs and hence is able to provide more efficient and informative pricing. 
In further regressions we extend the specifications that focus on the effect of the 
prominence of other similar stocks and add control variables identified in earlier research to 
influence the price discovery in international cross-listings, as discussed in Section 4.2. As 
mentioned above, the three control variables, U.S. / Total dollar volume, U.S. / Home effective 
spread and Ln (Market capitalization), are correlated between one another and therefore we 
include them one by one, but for the completeness of the picture we also include them 
simultaneously. We acknowledge the problem of correlation between Own prominence and 
the control variables and also between the control variables themselves, but we want to make 
                                                 
19 Note that direct interpretation of the estimated coefficients is difficult because of the logistic transformation of 
the U.S. share in price discovery used as our dependent variable. The illustration is based on the results presented  29
sure that the strongly significant link between our prominence measures and the U.S. share in 
price discovery reported in Tables 5 and 6 is not driven by the fact that our prominence 
variables capture the effect of the excluded control variables. The results of the extended 
regressions are presented in Table 7 (the Gonzalo-Granger method) and Table 8 (the 
Hasbrouck method). 
The findings on the prominence of other similar stocks reported in Tables 5 and 6 
remain to a large extent unchanged after the inclusion of control variables. The only 
difference is the lack of significance of the Prominence of European stocks less own in some 
specifications with the U.S. share in price discovery calculated following the Gonzalo-
Granger method (columns (vi), (vii) and (viii) of Table 7). Also, as in the earlier regressions, 
the Prominence of country’s stocks less own remains insignificant in tests with Hasbrouck’s 
definition of shares in price discovery. In all other specifications the prominence of related 
stocks is found to have a strong positive impact on the U.S. share in price discovery 
confirming informational advantages of concentrated market making. Considering the mixed 
results for the prominence of sibling stocks from the same country or the prominence of other 
European stocks, which as we find depend on the definition of the shares in price discovery, 
the most consistent results are found for the prominence of other non-U.S. stocks. We show 
that a NYSE specialist is able to improve price discovery of a non-U.S. stock if he pays more 
attention to other foreign stocks. It shows the benefits of concentrating specialists in 
international stocks from multiple countries as reported in Section 5.2. It appears that there is 
a larger informational advantage from allocating attention across a broader set of international 
securities rather than focusing on country-specific groups of firms. The finding is also in line 
with evidence in Corwin (2004) who shows that new foreign stocks tend to be allocated to 
                                                                                                                                                         
in Table 5.  30
specialist firms that already trade other foreign securities. Our findings document the benefits 
of clustering non-U.S. stocks at the individual specialist level. 
The positive effect of the stock’s own prominence remains highly significant when the 
control variables are added individually but loses its significance when they are all added at 
the same time (specifications (iv), (viii) and (xii)). It is worth noting that Own prominence has 
a much stronger effect than the relative trading volume which is found to be the key driver of 
the U.S. share in price discovery in earlier studies (Eun and Sabherwal, 2003; Grammig et al., 
2005b). When the two variables are included jointly in the regressions, U.S. / Total dollar 
volume is never significant. Looking at other control variables, we find strong evidence that 
lower bid-ask spreads in the U.S. relative to the home market increase the U.S. contribution to 
price discovery calculated following the Hasbrouck method (reported in Table 8), consistent 
with earlier research (Eun and Sabherwal, 2003; Grammig et al., 2005b). We also find some 
evidence that the U.S. share increases for larger firms. After controlling for other factors, 
there is no difference in the U.S. share in price discovery between the U.K. and French stocks 
as the U.K. dummy is by and large insignificant. 
We are aware of the potential endogenous relations in our tests. For example, one may 
argue that there is a reversed causality between the U.S. share in price discovery and the 
(relative) liquidity of a stock (see, e.g. Grammig et al., 2005b, and Baruch et al., 2007). 
However, it is not clear how this affects our main conclusions. If indeed the higher U.S. share 
in price discovery increases the stock’s own liquidity and hence its own prominence, it would 
in turn lead to a reduction in the prominence of other related stocks (the negative correlation 
between the two is reported in Table 4). So in fact, our findings on the positive relation 
between the U.S. share in price discovery and the prominence of other related stocks may be 
underestimated and the true relation is even stronger. Furthermore, the relation between stock 
characteristics and specialist portfolios can be endogenous (Corwin and Coughenour, 2008).  31
The endogeneity problems could be solved in a two-stage procedure with appropriate 
instruments for all endogenous variables. However, we are unable to find suitable variables 
that could serve as valid instruments which hinders the application and relevance of the 
procedure. 
 
5.4. Prominence of Related Stocks and Adverse Selection 
  To find some direct evidence on whether paying more attention to similar stocks 
improves the information environment of market makers, we analyze how the adverse 
selection component of the bid-ask spread of a stock varies across different levels of the 
prominence of related stocks in the same specialist portfolio. Following Huang and Stoll 
(1996) and Bacidore and Sofianos (2002), for each sample stock we calculate the adverse 
selection component as the difference between the effective and realized spreads. The 
effective spread is calculated as twice the absolute value of the difference between the trade 
price and the quote midpoint at the time of the trade, divided by the quote midpoint. The 
realized spread is calculated as twice the difference between the trade price and the quote 
midpoint prevailing 5 minutes after the trade
20, multiplied by –1 if the trade is seller-initiated, 
and divided by the quote midpoint at the time of the trade. A trade is considered seller-
initiated if the trade price is below the quoted midpoint. The equally weighted mean of the 
adverse selection component across all trades for each stock in the trading overlap each day is 
calculated first, and then the daily means are averaged over the sample period. The adverse 
selection component is then regressed on a constant, Prominence of related stocks less own, 
where related stocks, as before, refer to stocks from the same country, European stocks or 
non-U.S. stocks interchangeably, and Ln (Market capitalization) to control for unobservable 
firm information characteristics correlated with size, such as transparency and visibility. 
                                                 
20 The analysis based on realised spreads calculated with a 30-minute lag yields qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar results.  32
The (untabulated) results
21 confirm our earlier findings. The estimated coefficients of 
the prominence of other similar stocks are all negative, but only the coefficient of Prominence 
of non-U.S. stocks less own is statistically significant (-0.0048, with p-value of 0.080). We 
find that, on average, an increase in the prominence of other foreign stocks from the 25
th to 
the 75
th percentile of its distribution is associated with a reduction in the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread by 25 basis points. It lends further support to our hypothesis 
that concentrating market makers in similar stocks increases the U.S. contribution to price 
discovery due to reduced information asymmetries. 
 
5.5. Robustness of Cross-Sectional Results to Stock Reassignments  
As mentioned in Section 2, stocks are hardly ever relocated between specialist firms
22 
but reassignments of securities between individual specialists within a firm are relatively 
common (Anand et al., 2008; Corwin and Coughenour, 2008). During our sample period, 
reassignments within a specialists firm affected 13 sample stocks on four different days.
23 As 
mentioned earlier, we construct our prominence variables to take into account the daily 
changes in the composition of specialist portfolios. However, Battalio et al. (2006) and Anand 
et al. (2008) document that trading behavior and liquidity change when securities change the 
location at which they trade on the NYSE floor. To check whether our main findings on the 
prominence of similar stocks are robust to stock reassignments between specialist portfolios, 
we re-estimate all cross-sectional regressions excluding the 13 relocated stocks. The 
(untabulated) results remain to a very large extent qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged. 
The only differences in the main variables of interest are the marginally insignificant 
coefficients of the Prominence of non-U.S. stocks less own in two specifications with the 
                                                 
21 The results in this and subsequent sections are not tabulated to preserve space. They are all available from the 
authors upon request. 
22 We do not find any such reallocation of any of the sample stock in the sample period. 
23 Among those 13 stocks, two stocks were reassigned twice.  33
Hasbrouck share in price discovery (equivalent to specification (vii) of Table 6 and 
specification (xii) of Table 8). In a regression equivalent to the specification (vi) of Table 7, 
the Prominence of European stocks less own becomes marginally significant. 
 
5.6. Robustness of Cross-Sectional Results to Alternative Price Discovery Estimation 
  We start with (untabulated) robustness checks of our main cross-sectional tests 
changing the sampling intervals at which the VECM models and consequently shares in price 
discovery are estimated. The results with the U.S. share in price discovery estimated at 2-
minute intervals change little compared to the results at 1-minute intervals reported in Tables 
5 to 8. When the interval is lowered to 3 minutes or to 10 minutes, we find improvement in 
the coefficients of the Prominence of European stocks less own that become significant in 
Gonzalo-Granger specifications equivalent to specifications (vi), (vii) and (viii) of Table 7. 
However, with the interval set to 10 minutes, the prominence of other European or non-U.S. 
stocks loses its significance in selected specifications with the Hasbrouck share in price 
discovery. 
We also re-estimate the information shares excluding the first and the last 15 minutes 
of the trading overlap of each trading day, with the interval set to one minute as in the main 
tests. Werner and Kleidon (1996) found in their study of U.S.-listed U.K. stocks that the 
trading volume and price volatility follow a U-shaped pattern throughout the day, with the 
higher levels around the beginning and closing of the market. On the other hand, Moulton and 
Wei (2009) using a more recent sample of U.S.-listed British stocks find that during the 
overlapping trading hours spreads trade at an intermediate line rather than following separate 
U-shaped curves on the London Stock Exchange and NYSE. They ascribe this development 
to greater market integration in recent years. Nevertheless, one may argue that the estimation 
of shares in price discovery can be distorted in the period immediately after the U.S. market  34
opening and before the European market closing. We find little qualitative difference in our 
general cross-sectional results when the first and the last 15 minutes of the overlap are 
excluded. Generally, the results for the Prominence of European stocks less own become 
consistently significant across both Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck definitions of shares in 
price discovery. The coefficients of the Prominence of non-U.S. stocks less own remain 
significant in the Gonzalo-Granger specifications but lose their significance in regressions 
with the Hasbrouck measure of price discovery. 
Taken together, we confirm the importance of the prominence of other related stocks. 
We are not able to conclusively determine though which level of relatedness is most 
important as across our tests we find some significant evidence in favor of every of them. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we shed more light on informational benefits of concentrated market 
making. We base on theoretical arguments in Strobl (2001) and Baruch et al. (2007) to 
analyze whether more attention devoted to similar securities enables a market maker to extract 
information relevant to a stock from order flow to related securities and consequently whether 
it leads to improved price discovery of the stock. Our empirical tests are focused on New 
York Stock Exchange specialists and price discovery of non-U.S. stocks in their portfolios. 
We analyze 64 British and French companies cross-listed on the NYSE over the six-month 
period from January 2003 through June 2003. Applying both the Hasbrouck and Gonzalo-
Granger methods to calculate the U.S. shares in price discovery we find a substantial variation 
of the U.S. share across our sample which we attribute to the differences in the information 
environment of NYSE specialists who make a market in our sample stocks. In a set of cross-
sectional regressions we analyze how the U.S. share in price discovery differs with the 
prominence of related stocks in a specialist portfolio. We define related stocks as stocks from  35
the same country (U.K. or France in our case), the same region (Europe) or all non-U.S. 
stocks in the specialist portfolio.  
We find statistically and economically significant evidence that an increase in the 
prominence of related stocks in the specialist portfolio leads to a higher U.S. share in price 
discovery of our sample stocks. Considering that market making in foreign stocks is 
associated with inherent information asymmetries and adverse selection as documented by 
Bacidore and Sofianos (2002), we interpret our findings as evidence that concentrating market 
makers in similar stocks reduces information asymmetries and improves the information 
environment. We find that there is a larger informational advantage from allocating attention 
across a broader set of international securities rather than focusing on country-specific groups 
of firms. To support our argument on informational benefits of clustered market making, we 
show that an increase in the prominence of other foreign stocks in the specialist portfolio 
significantly reduces the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. Our findings 
complement the literature on the link between allocation on attention in securities trading and 
market quality (Corwin and Coughenour, 2008; Boulatov et al., 2009), but are also related to 
the substantial body of literature on price discovery in cross-listings and on the role of 
dedicated market makers (e.g., Venkataraman and Waisburd, 2007). 
Our findings are based on NYSE data for cross-listed stocks but they can be 
generalized to any market design in which a dealer allocates attention across a set of 
securities. We show that the dealer’s information environment can be improved if he allocates 
more attention to related securities. The application goes beyond dedicated market making 
though and may be also relevant to other trading designs with human involvement, such as 
trading desks in financial institutions. 
  36
References 
Anand A, Chakravarty S, Chuwonganant C. Cleaning house: Stock reassignments on the 
NYSE. Journal of Financial Markets 2008 (forthcoming). 
Bacidore JM, Battalio R, Galpin N, Jennings R. Sources of liquidity for NYSE-listed non-
U.S. Stocks. Journal of Banking and Finance 2005;29; 3075-3098. 
Bacidore JM, Sofianos G. Liquidity provision and specialist trading in NYSE-listed non-U.S. 
stocks. Journal of Financial Economics 2002;63; 133-158. 
Baillie RT, Booth GG, Tse Y, Zabotina T. Price discovery and common factor models Journal 
of Financial Markets, 2002;5; 309-321. 
Battalio R, Ellul A, Jennings R. Reputation effects in trading on the New York stock 
exchange. Journal of Finance 2007;62; 1243-1271. 
Baruch S, Karolyi GA, Lemmon ML. Multi-market trading and liquidity: Theory and 
evidence. Journal of Finance 2007; 62; 2169-2200. 
Boulatov A, Hatch BC, Johnson SA, Lei AYC. Dealer attention, the speed of quote 
adjustments to information and net dealer revenue. Journal of Banking and Finance 
2009;33; 1531-1542. 
Chan K, Covrig V, Ng L. What determines the domestic bias and foreign bias? Evidence from 
mutual fund equity allocations worldwide. Journal of Finance 2005;60; 1495-1534. 
Chordia T, Roll R, Subrahmanyam A. Market liquidity and trading activity. Journal of 
Finance 2001;56; 501-530. 
Corwin SA. Specialist performance and new listings allocations on the NYSE: An empirical 
analysis. Journal of Financial Markets 2004;7; 27-51. 
Corwin SA, Coughenour JF. Limited attention and the allocation of effort in securities 
trading. Journal of Finance 2008;63; 3031-3067.  37
de Jong F. Measures of contributions to price discovery: A comparison. Journal of Financial 
Markets 2002;5; 323-327. 
Domowitz I, Glen J, Madhavan A. International cross-listing and order flow migration: 
evidence from an emerging market. Journal of Finance 1998;53; 2001-2027. 
Eun CS, Sabherwal S. Cross-border listings and price discovery: Evidence from U.S.-listed 
Canadian stocks. Journal of Finance 2003;58; 549-575. 
Foerster SR, Karolyi GA. Multimarket trading and liquidity: A transaction data analysis of 
Canada-U.S. interlistings. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Money 1998;8; 393-412. 
Gagnon L, Karolyi GA. Multi-market trading and arbitrage. Ohio State University Working 
Paper 2004. 
Gonzalo J, Granger CWJ. Estimation of common long-memory components in cointegrating 
systems. Journal of Business and Economics Statistics; 1995;13; 27-36. 
Grammig J, Melvin M, Schlag C. Internationally cross-listed stock prices during overlapping 
trading hours: price discovery and exchange rate effects. Journal of Empirical Finance 
2005a;12; 139-164. 
Grammig J, Melvin M, Schlag C. The role of U.S. trading in pricing internationally cross-
listed stocks. University of Tuebingen Working Paper 2005b. 
Grinblatt M, Keloharju M. How distance, language, and culture influence stockholdings and 
trades. Journal of Finance 2001;56; 1053-1073. 
Halling M, Pagano M, Randl O, Zechner J. Where is the market? Evidence from cross-listings 
in the United States. Review of Financial Studies 2008;21; 725-761. 
Harris FH deB, McInish TH, Wood RA. Security price adjustment across exchanges: An 
investigation of common factor components for Dow Stocks. Journal of Financial 
Markets 2002;5; 277-308.  38
Harris FH deB, McInish TH, Wood RA. DCX trading in New York and Frankfurt: corporate 
governance affects trading costs across international dual-listings. Wake Forest 
University Working Paper 2003. 
Hasbrouck J. One security, many markets: determining the contributions to price discovery. 
Journal of Finance 1995;50; 1175-1199. 
Hendershott T, Moulton PC. Speed and stock market quality. University of California, 
Berkeley Working Paper 2009. 
Huang RD, Stoll HR. Dealer versus auction markets: A paired comparison of execution costs 
on NASDAQ and the NYSE. Journal of Financial Economics 1996;41; 313-357. 
Hupperets ECJ, Menkveld AJ. Intraday analysis of market integration: Dutch blue chips 
traded in Amsterdam and New York. Journal of Financial Markets; 2002;5; 57-82. 
Johansen S. Estimation and hypothesis testing of cointegration vectors in Gaussian vector 
autoregressive models. Econometrica 1991;59; 1551-1580. 
Kahneman D. Attention and effort. Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, NJ; 1973. 
Kang J-K, Stulz RM. Why is there a home bias? An analysis of foreign portfolio equity 
ownership in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics 1997;46; 3-28. 
Kaul A, Mehrotra V. The role of trades in price discovery convergence: A study of dual-listed 
Canadian stocks. Journal of Empirical Finance 2007;14; 196-219. 
Kim M, Szakmary AC, Mathur I. Price transmission dynamics between ADRs and their 
underlying foreign securities. Journal of Banking and Finance 2000;24; 1359-1382. 
Lieberman O, Ben-Zion U, Hauser S. A characterisation of the price behaviour of 
international dual stocks: An error correction approach. Journal of International Money 
and Finance 1999;18; 289-304.  39
Menkveld AJ, Koopman SJ, Lucas A. Modeling around-the-clock price discovery for cross-
listed stocks using state space methods. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 
2007;25; 213-225. 
Moulton PC, Wei L. A tale of two time zones: The impact of substitutes on cross- listed stock 
liquidity. Journal of Financial Markets 2009 (forthcoming). 
Muscarella CJ, Vetsuypens MR. Stock splits: signalling or liquidity? The case of ADR ‘solo-
splits’. Journal of Financial Economics 1996;42; 3-26. 
Parlour CA, Seppi DJ. Liquidity-based competition for order flow. Review of Financial 
Studies 2003;16; 301-343. 
Pascual R, Pascual-Fuster B, Climent F. Cross-listing, price discovery and the 
informativeness of the trading process. Journal of Financial Markets 2006;9; 144-161. 
Stickel SE, Verrecchia RE. Evidence that trading volume sustains stock price changes. 
Financial Analysts Journal 1994;50; 57-67. 
Strobl G. On the optimal allocation of new security listings to specialists. Working Paper, 
University of Pennsylvania 2001. 
Venkataraman K, Waisburd AC. The value of designated market maker. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 2007;42; 735-758. 
Werner IM, Kleidon AW. U.K. and U.S. trading of British cross-listed stocks: An intraday 
analysis of market integration. Review of Financial Studies 1996; 9; 619-664. 
Wang SS, Rui OM, Firth M. Return and volatility behavior of dually-traded stocks: The case 
of Hong Kong. Journal of International Money and Finance 2002;21; 265-293.  40
Appendix. Definitions of Explanatory Variables Used in Cross-Sectional Regressions 
Variable Definition 
Own prominence  The sample stock’s prominence in a NYSE specialist portfolio. A 
specialist portfolio is defined as all common stocks and ADRs traded in 
the same post and panel location on the NYSE floor. The prominence is 
calculated as the proportion of the stock’s dollar volume in the total dollar 
volume of the specialist portfolio it belongs to. First, for every day dollar 
volume of all stocks in the portfolio in the trading overlap between the 
U.S. and home market is calculated. Then, the daily prominence of the 
stock is computed and the daily prominence is then averaged over the 
sample period. 
Prominence of country’s stocks  Prominence of all stocks from the sample stock’s country in a NYSE 
specialist portfolio the sample stock belongs to. A specialist portfolio is 
defined as all common stocks and ADRs traded in the same post and 
panel location on the NYSE floor. The prominence is calculated as the 
proportion of the stocks’ dollar volume in the total dollar volume of the 
specialist portfolio. First, for every day dollar volume of all stocks in the 
portfolio in the trading overlap between the U.S. and home market is 
calculated. Then, the daily prominence of the group of stocks is computed 
and the daily prominence is then averaged over the sample period. 
Prominence of country’s stocks less own  Calculated as Prominence of country’s stocks minus Own prominence 
Prominence of European stocks  Prominence of all European stocks in a NYSE specialist portfolio the 
sample stock belongs to. A specialist portfolio is defined as all common 
stocks and ADRs traded in the same post and panel location on the NYSE 
floor. The prominence is calculated as the proportion of European stocks’ 
dollar volume in the total dollar volume of the specialist portfolio. First, 
for every day dollar volume of all stocks in the portfolio in the trading 
overlap between the U.S. and home market is calculated. Then, the daily 
prominence of the group of stocks is computed and the daily prominence 
is then averaged over the sample period. 
Prominence of European stocks less own  Calculated as Prominence of European stocks minus Own prominence 
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks  Prominence of all non-U.S. stocks in a NYSE specialist portfolio the 
sample stock belongs to. A specialist portfolio is defined as all common 
stocks and ADRs traded in the same post and panel location on the NYSE 
floor. The prominence is calculated as the proportion of non-U.S. stocks’ 
dollar volume in the total dollar volume of the specialist portfolio. First, 
for every day dollar volume of all stocks in the portfolio in the trading 
overlap between the U.S. and home market is calculated. Then, the daily 
prominence of the group of stocks is computed and the daily prominence 
is then averaged over the sample period. 
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks less own  Calculated as Prominence of non-U.S. stocks minus Own prominence 
U.S. / Total dollar volume  The ratio of the dollar volume in the U.S. and the total (U.S. and home 
market) dollar volume. First, a stock’s dollar volume is summed for both 
exchanges within the trading overlap every day and daily ratios are 
calculated. Then, the daily ratios are averaged over the sample period.  
U.S. / Home effective spread  The ratio of U.S. and home effective spreads. Effective spread is 
calculated as twice the absolute value of the difference between the trade 
price and the midpoint of the prevailing bid and ask quotes at the time of 
the trade, divided by the quote midpoint. First, it is averaged across all 
trades on an exchange for a given firm within the trading overlap each 
day. Then, daily ratios are calculated and the daily ratios are averaged 
over the sample period. 
Ln (Market capitalization)  The natural logarithm of the average daily capitalization (in USD 
millions) over the sample period. 
U.K. dummy  A dummy variable equal to one for U.K. stocks and zero for French 
stocks. 
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Table 1. Capitalization of Sample Companies and Main Liquidity and Trading Characteristics 
within Overlapping Trading Hours 
 
The table presents descriptive statistics for a sample that includes 43 U.K. and 21 French stocks cross-listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange from January 1, 2003 through June 30, 2003. Market capitalization is measured 
as the average daily market capitalization over the sample period. Dollar volume, Number of Trades and Number 
of quote revisions are first summed for each individual firm for each day within the trading overlap between the 
home and U.S. market, and then for each firm the daily observations are averaged over the sample period. 
Number of quote revisions is based on the number of changes in the best bid and/or best ask price. Effective 
spread is calculated as twice the absolute value of the difference between the trade price and the midpoint of the 
prevailing bid and ask quotes at the time of the trade, divided by the quote midpoint. It is averaged across all 
trades for a given firm within the trading overlap each day, and then the daily observations are averaged over the 
sample period. U.S. / Total dollar volume and U.S. / Home effective spread are based on the appropriate ratios 
calculated for each firm for each day, and then for each firm averaged over the sample period. 
 




percentile  median  75
th 
percentile 
Panel A. All stocks         
Market capitalization ($m)    21,349.71  32,713.63  2,919.25  7,863.98  22,543.13 
Dollar volume ($k)  Home  40,811.86  57,989.98  8,764.08  21,068.25  45,820.59 
 U.S.  3,504.58  8,698.81  73.62  291.40  1,368.27 
U.S. / Total dollar volume    0.0436  0.0527  0.0101  0.0204  0.0577 
Effective spread (%)  Home  0.6747  1.9399  0.1461  0.1934  0.3707 
 U.S.  0.6221  0.9058  0.1965  0.3458  0.6444 
U.S. / Home effective spread    2.2946  1.5544  1.3108  2.1124  2.8075 
Number of trades  Home  772.79  623.53  330.84  541.43  1,124.21 
 U.S.  83.35  123.46  12.23  28.42  90.57 
Number of quote revisions  Home  430.66  296.68  228.52  387.59  552.52 
 U.S.  251.02  131.22  137.73  234.97  328.00 
Panel B. U.K. stocks            
Market capitalization ($m)    23,470.69  36,780.28  2,933.38  6,936.03  25,333.32 
Dollar volume ($k)  Home  45,338.11  65,748.12  10,615.22  19,824.13  46,422.51 
 U.S.  4,045.78  10,135.08  82.67  335.04  1,291.67 
U.S. / Total dollar volume    0.0447  0.0535  0.0124  0.0190  0.0627 
Effective spread (%)  Home  0.8928  2.3408  0.1722  0.2428  0.4198 
 U.S.  0.5523  0.8040  0.1866  0.3072  0.6050 
U.S. / Home effective spread    1.8794  0.9592  1.1378  1.7344  2.3891 
Number of trades  Home  604.89  426.97  322.60  433.14  813.03 
 U.S.  86.31  131.77  15.30  29.92  87.23 
Number of quote revisions  Home  364.05  209.37  227.62  359.83  456.96 
 U.S.  248.43  126.06  157.37  228.48  307.88 
(continued)  42
Table 1. – continued 
 




percentile  median  75
th 
percentile 
Panel C. French stocks         
Market capitalization ($m)    17,006.76  22,377.22  2,347.27  8,524.88  18,142.05 
Dollar volume ($k)  Home  31,543.82  37,158.99  4,539.06  25,431.25  44,466.09 
 U.S.  2,396.42  4,552.76  62.95  111.72  2,346.57 
U.S. / Total dollar volume    0.0414  0.0524  0.0100  0.0219  0.0425 
Effective spread (%)  Home  0.2283  0.1886  0.1105  0.1817  0.2381 
 U.S.  0.7648  1.0933  0.2006  0.4923  0.7681 
U.S. / Home effective spread    3.1449  2.1329  1.6010  2.7610  3.9029 
Number of trades  Home  1,116.59  810.63  419.17  942.04  1,733.30 
 U.S.  77.29  107.21  7.66  20.02  142.10 
Number of quote revisions  Home  567.05  395.13  229.43  488.66  810.97 
 U.S.  256.31  144.32  129.43  286.62  330.88 
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Table 2. Vector Error Correction Model Coefficients and the U.S. Share in Price Discovery 
 
Panels A and B of the table present cross-sectional descriptive statistics of coefficients of Vector Error 
Correction Model given by equation (1). Panels C and D present descriptive statistics of the U.S. share in price 
discovery calculated using the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) method as given by equation (9) and the Hasbrouck 
(1995) method as given by equation (7), respectively. The sample includes 43 U.K. and 21 French stocks cross-
listed on the NYSE from January 1, 2003 through June 30, 2003. 
 
 mean  std  deviation  25
th percentile  median  75
th percentile 
Panel A. Cointegrating vector normalized on the home price 
1 β   1.0000 0.0000 1.0000  1.0000 1.0000 
2 β   -1.0087 0.0338  -1.0097  -1.0029  -0.9975 
Panel B. Adjustment coefficients 
1 α   -0.0116 0.0180  -0.0128  -0.0076  -0.0039 
2 α   0.0526 0.0493 0.0204  0.0363 0.0717 
Panel C. U.S. share in price discovery – Gonzalo-Granger method 
Full  sample  0.2031 0.1908 0.0744  0.1427 0.2665 
U.K.  stocks  0.2031 0.1815 0.0960  0.1590 0.2540 
French  stocks 0.2031 0.2133 0.0540  0.1169 0.3163 
Panel D. U.S. share in price discovery – Hasbrouck method 
Full  sample  0.1550 0.1580 0.0521  0.0897 0.1913 
U.K.  stocks  0.1493 0.1442 0.0647  0.0898 0.1576 
French  stocks 0.1667 0.1865 0.0251  0.0855 0.2954 
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Table 3. Prominence of Sample Stocks and Stocks Related to Them in Specialist Portfolios 
 
The table presents descriptive statistics for prominence measures used in cross-sectional regressions. The 
definitions of the variables are presented in the Appendix. The sample includes 43 U.K. and 21 French stocks 
cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange from January 1, 2003 through June 30, 2003. 
 




percentile  median  75
th 
percentile 
Panel A. All stocks        
Own prominence  0.1132  0.1973  0.0060  0.0206  0.1119 
Prominence of country’s stocks  0.2153  0.2108  0.0211  0.1693  0.3083 
Prominence of country’s stocks less own  0.1021  0.1413  0.0002  0.0387  0.1500 
Prominence of European stocks  0.5198  0.3284  0.2834  0.5026  0.7617 
Prominence of European stocks less own  0.4066  0.3150  0.1241  0.3956  0.5782 
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks  0.7305  0.3186  0.5608  0.8869  1.0000 
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks less own  0.6173  0.3300  0.4059  0.7030  0.9242 
Panel B. U.K. stocks          
Own prominence  0.1110  0.1968  0.0079  0.0282  0.1019 
Prominence of country’s stocks  0.2278  0.2115  0.0624  0.1772  0.4217 
Prominence of country’s stocks less own  0.1167  0.1483  0.0050  0.0566  0.1640 
Prominence of European stocks  0.4924  0.2961  0.2893  0.4893  0.6699 
Prominence of European stocks less own  0.3813  0.2690  0.1305  0.3943  0.5265 
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks  0.6993  0.3398  0.5126  0.8098  0.9901 
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks less own  0.5882  0.3470  0.2889  0.6912  0.9056 
Panel B. French. stocks          
Own prominence  0.1176  0.2030  0.0038  0.0156  0.1743 
Prominence of country’s stocks  0.1898  0.2121  0.0175  0.0411  0.2964 
Prominence of country’s stocks less own  0.0722  0.1237  0.0000  0.0002  0.0466 
Prominence of European stocks  0.5759  0.3880  0.1678  0.5679  0.9921 
Prominence of European stocks less own  0.4583  0.3955  0.1124  0.4409  0.9029 
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks  0.7943  0.2663  0.6059  0.9608  1.0000 
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks less own  0.6767  0.2909  0.4494  0.7149  0.9711 
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 Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
 
The table presents Pearson correlation coefficients between variables used in cross-sectional regressions. See the Appendix for definitions of the variables. The sample 
includes 43 U.K. and 21 French stocks cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange from January 1, 2003 through June 30, 2003. 
***,
 ** and 
* denote significance of the 
































































































































































































































































































































Prominence of country’s stocks    1.0000  0.4278
*** 0.5347
*** 0.0800  0.3780








*** -0.2015  0.0622  -0.2022 







Prominence of European stocks less own          1.0000  0.5726
*** 0.6987
***  -0.1737 0.0268 0.0282 
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks            1.0000  0.8156
*** 0.2003  -0.2641
** 0.3491
*** 
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks less own              1.0000  -0.2959
** 0.0256  -0.0628 
U.S. / Total dollar volume                1.0000  -0.4821
*** 0.4854
*** 
U.S. / Home effective spread                  1.0000  -0.4985
*** 
Ln (Market capitalization)                    1.0000   46
Table 5. Stocks’ Prominence and the U.S. Share in Price Discovery - Gonzalo-Granger Method 
The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of the U.S. share in price discovery calculated on the basis of the Gonzalo-Granger method given by equation (9). The 
explanatory variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample includes 43 U.K. and 21 French stocks cross-listed on the NYSE from January 1, 2003 through June 30, 2003. p-
values of the t-test of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. The t-test is based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
 
  Exp 
sign  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)  (vii) 
Constant    -2.852 -3.385 -3.283 -3.574 -3.568 -4.712 -4.711 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Own  prominence  +  5.363   6.013   5.983   6.979 
    (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Prominence of country’s stocks  +    5.294           
      (0.000)       
Prominence of country’s stocks less own  +      3.503         
       (0.034)      
Prominence of European stocks  +      2.556     
        (0.005)     
Prominence of European stocks less own  +      1.589     
        (0.068)     
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks  +        3.378   
          (0.003)   
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks less own  +         2.716 
           ( 0 . 0 1 3 )  
Adjusted  R-sq.    0.172 0.193 0.197 0.102 0.199 0.178 0.278 
Number  of  observations    64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
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 Table 6. Stocks’ Prominence and the U.S. Share in Price Discovery - Hasbrouck Method 
The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of the U.S. share in price discovery calculated on the basis of the Hasbrouck method given by equation (7). The 
explanatory variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample includes 43 U.K. and 21 French stocks cross-listed on the NYSE from January 1, 2003 through June 30, 2003. p-
values of the t-test of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. The t-test is based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
 
  Exp 
sign  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)  (vii) 
Constant    -2.820 -3.176 -3.057 -3.564 -3.559 -3.641 -3.640 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Own  prominence  +  4.507   4.863   5.146   5.219 
    (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Prominence of country’s stocks  +    4.020           
      (0.000)       
Prominence of country’s stocks less own  +      1.922         
       (0.159)      
Prominence of European stocks  +      2.412     
        (0.004)     
Prominence of European stocks less own  +      1.640     
        (0.046)     
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks  +        1.822   
          (0.008)   
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks less own  +         1.198 
           ( 0 . 0 6 1 )  
Adjusted  R-sq.    0.228 0.206 0.237 0.178 0.295 0.088 0.259 
Number  of  observations    64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
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Table 7. Determinants of the U.S. Share in Price Discovery - Gonzalo-Granger Method 
The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of the U.S. share in price discovery calculated on the basis of the Gonzalo-Granger method given by equation (9). The 
explanatory variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample includes 43 U.K. and 21 French stocks cross-listed on the NYSE from January 1, 2003 through June 30, 2003. p-
values of the t-test of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. The t-test is based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
 
  Exp 
sign (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)  (vii)  (viii)  (ix) (x) (xi)  (xii) 
Constant    -3.536 -2.019 -8.793 -7.421 -4.073 -2.669 -8.126 -6.817 -5.381 -4.284 -8.624 -7.896 
   (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000)  (0.016) (0.001) (0.056) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.023) 
Own  prominence  + 5.572 4.436 2.715 1.319 5.820 4.636 3.082 1.841 6.675 6.041 4.564 3.295 
   (0.009) (0.001) (0.040) (0.382) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.033) (0.299) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.088) 
Prominence of country’s stocks less own  +  3.310  3.301  3.614  3.572                 
    (0.050) (0.040) (0.036) (0.038)         
Prominence of European stocks less own  +          1.706  1.459  1.155  1.020         
         (0.061)  (0.120) (0.116) (0.188)     
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks less own  +             2.884 2.625 2.445 2.307 
              (0.010) (0.034) (0.011) (0.027) 
U.S. / Total dollar volume  +  1.911     3.378  1.061     2.456  1.979     3.350 
    (0.800)    (0.545) (0.890)     (0.683) (0.793)    (0.595) 
U.S. / Home effective spread  -    -0.415   -0.257   -0.352   -0.243   -0.243   -0.146 
     (0.078)  (0.397)  (0.158)  (0.424)  (0.364)  (0.636) 
Ln (Market capitalization)  +     0.639  0.578     0.528  0.479     0.438  0.418 
       (0.019) (0.085)    (0.058) (0.156)    (0.075) (0.151) 
U.K. dummy  + 0.356  -0.170 0.201  -0.131 0.639 0.170 0.476 0.152 0.765 0.437 0.631 0.418 
   (0.562) (0.739) (0.745) (0.792) (0.290)  (0.714) (0.460) (0.752) (0.186) (0.363) (0.309) (0.394) 
Adjusted  R-sq.    0.176 0.221 0.268 0.264 0.188 0.220 0.246 0.237 0.278 0.292 0.317 0.302 
Number  of  observations    64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
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 Table 8. Determinants of the U.S. Share in Price Discovery – Hasbrouck Method 
The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of the U.S. share in price discovery calculated on the basis of the Hasbrouck method given by equation (7). The 
explanatory variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample includes 43 U.K. and 21 French stocks cross-listed on the NYSE from January 1, 2003 through June 30, 2003. p-
values of the t-test of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. The t-test is based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
 
  Exp 
sign (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)  (vii)  (viii)  (ix) (x) (xi)  (xii) 
Constant    -3.577 -1.279 -6.892 -3.836 -4.320 -2.070 -6.462 -3.541 -4.474 -1.913 -6.794 -3.857 
   (0.000) (0.017) (0.001) (0.012) (0.000)  (0.022) (0.001) (0.010) (0.000) (0.016) (0.001) (0.011) 
Own  prominence  + 3.612 2.507 2.714 0.738 4.243 3.011 3.641 1.793 4.156 2.893 3.500 1.180 
   (0.010) (0.000) (0.005) (0.465) (0.008)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.204) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.323) 
Prominence of country’s stocks less own  +  1.542  1.534  1.745  1.657                 
    (0.208) (0.135) (0.135) (0.107)         
Prominence of European stocks less own  +          1.790  1.417  1.515  1.262         
         (0.043)  (0.068) (0.046) (0.096)     
Prominence of non-U.S. stocks less own  +             1.394 0.794 1.072 0.633 
              (0.029) (0.052) (0.037) (0.099) 
U.S. / Total dollar volume  +  5.509     3.157  4.548     2.081  5.540     3.133 
    (0.197)    (0.349) (0.356)     (0.604) (0.243)    (0.387) 
U.S. / Home effective spread  -    -0.617   -0.537   -0.555   -0.512   -0.565   -0.508 
     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ln (Market capitalization)  +     0.411  0.268     0.286  0.165     0.322  0.220 
       (0.039) (0.037)    (0.081) (0.122)    (0.063) (0.070) 
U.K. dummy  + 0.685  -0.084 0.606  -0.064 0.899 0.175 0.831 0.169 0.881 0.123 0.802 0.115 
   (0.207) (0.855) (0.197) (0.886) (0.117)  (0.739) (0.112) (0.745) (0.124) (0.016) (0.115) (0.818) 
Adjusted  R-sq.    0.256 0.434 0.318 0.442 0.338 0.478 0.363 0.470 0.301 0.438 0.332 0.437 
Number  of  observations    64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 







Figure 1. Opening Hours of Stock Exchanges under Consideration 
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